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Abstract 
We examine how unemployment affects the separation risk of 
heterosexual co-residing couples using an innovative method and large 
panel surveys. Theoretically, unemployment spells may decrease the 
separation risk as a drop in resources makes separation more costly. In 
contrast, the separation risk should increase if unemployment creates 
stress and reduces the quality of couple relations. In addition, the effect 
may not be homogeneous for all couples. If men’s jobs are more 
consequential for household income and social status, male 
unemployment may undermine couple stability more than female 
unemployment. Moreover, low-income couples may be more vulnerable 
to the negative consequences of unemployment than high-income 
couples. We analyze the heterogeneous effects of unemployment on 
separation for Germany, Switzerland and the UK, using household panels 
that observe couples over time. We innovate by combining fixed-effects 
regressions with a matching method. This provides us with a control 
group of comparable couples that did not experience unemployment. For 
all three countries, our results show a doubling of the separation rate after 
an unemployment spell: It increases from 2% to 4% per year. This effect 
does not vary when men or women lose their job. However, contrary to 
Germany, it is higher for low-income couples than high-income couples 
in the UK where the welfare state provides only weak income protection 
to the unemployed. 
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Introduction 
The experience of unemployment has far-reaching consequences for individuals. It does not 
only hamper their work careers and lead to economic insecurity (Ehlert 2013), but also affects other 
life domains such as health and subjective well-being (Ervasti & Venetoklis 2010, Oesch & Lipps 
2013, Price et al. 2002). Moreover, the effects of unemployment often transcend the individual and 
may upset the whole household (McKee-Ryan & Maitoza 2018). Our paper’s question is how 
unemployment affects the likelihood of separation among heterosexual co-residing couples. 
Our starting point is an apparent paradox. Country-level evidence suggests that divorce rates 
decrease in periods of recessions when unemployment increases (Amato & Beattie 2011, Cohen 
2014, Kalmijn 2007, Schaller 2013). When material resources become scarce, the relative cost of 
separation may increase and thus enhance couple stability. At the same time, a number of 
individual-level studies indicate that workers who lose their job are also more likely to separate 
from their partners (e.g. Charles & Stephens 2004, Doiron & Mendolia 2012, Eliason 2012, Hansen 
2005). Economic hardship produces uncertainty and stress which may, in turn, decrease the quality 
of couple relations and increase the risk of union dissolution. Of course, increased stability at the 
macro-level and more instability at the couple level are compatible if divorce rates fall during 
recessions among couples who may worry about the economy, but who do not experience 
unemployment.  
Our paper’s objective is to analyze the existence of heterogeneous treatment effects of 
unemployment on union dissolution (Xie et al. 2012). The impact of unemployment on couples 
may vary depending on whether it is the man or the woman who loses his or her job. If the social 
norm to work is stronger for men or if men take home a larger share of the household income, their 
unemployment may create more stress and increase the risk of union dissolution to a greater extent. 
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Our paper thus examines whether couples are affected to a greater extent by his than her 
unemployment.  
The relationship may also vary for different socio-economic groups. We thus differentiate the 
effect of unemployment on low-income, mid-income and high-income couples. Two contrasting 
expectations exist on this issue. If one of the main benefits from marriage stems from shared 
consumption and insurance against negative earning shocks, individuals in low-income households 
may be less likely to separate after becoming unemployed. On the contrary, if union stability is a 
function of the resources that individuals possess, couples in low-income households may be at a 
greater risk of union dissolution after an unemployment spell (Hansen 2005). 
Our study adds to the literature by comparing the effect of unemployment on couples for three 
West European countries, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, using longitudinal data 
from three of Europe’s longest running household panels. Depending on a country’s welfare state, 
unemployment may have different consequences for couple relationships (Albertini and Kohli 
2012, Esping-Andersen 1999, Saraceno and Keck 2011).  
Previous studies suffer from the problem that individuals who lose their jobs are more likely to 
separate because they constitute a selective group who struggle both to keep down a job and keep 
their couple working.  Our paper’s methodological innovation is to combine panel fixed-effects 
regressions with a matching method. A key benefit of matching is that it provides a control group 
of couples who did not experience an unemployment spell, but who present the same risk factors 
for unemployment and union dissolution. By comparing the separation rate between couples who 
experience unemployment and comparable couples who did not, we obtain a difference-in-
differences model that brings us closer to estimating the true causal effect of unemployment on 
union dissolution than earlier analyses. 
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Our paper first presents the mechanisms through which unemployment affects the stability of 
couples. It then distinguishes between his and her unemployment and discusses the possibility of 
heterogeneous income effects. The methods section presents the data, measures and matching 
method. The results section shows how the separation rate varies after an unemployment spell by 
gender and income and provides several robustness tests. The conclusion compares our results with 
earlier findings.  
The link between unemployment and union dissolution 
In essence, the literature distinguishes three mechanisms through which unemployment may be 
associated with union dissolution. First, it may reduce the risk of union dissolution as a result of 
increased costs of separation. Second, unemployment may increase the risk of separation by 
creating stress and thus weakening relationship quality. Third, the association may be spurious and 
simply reflect selection if some underlying characteristics hamper both job stability and couple 
stability. 
Evidence at the aggregate level strongly suggests that divorce rates decrease in periods of 
recessions when unemployment is on the rise – be it in Europe (Kalmijn 2007) or the United States 
(Amato & Beattie 2011, Cohen 2014, Schaller 2013). This association is attributed to the increased 
relative cost of divorce: In times of economic uncertainty, separations may become more costly 
relative to a spouse’s or couple’s (diminishing) resources (Cohen 2014). A separation may not only 
lead to legal fees, but also increases the costs of housing and childcare, all the while decreasing the 
economies of scale that come with a larger household (Browning & Chiappori 1998). This, in turn, 
may reduce the probability of union dissolution.  
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The negative relationship between unemployment rates and divorce rates is evident at the 
macro-level only. High unemployment rates may thus affect the decision-making of the majority 
of couples who do not experience unemployment, but who are worried about the economic context 
and therefore shy away from separation. This macro-level explanation does not rule out that at the 
individual level, workers who actually lose their job may still have a higher likelihood of breaking 
up. The main mechanism through which unemployment would increase the risk of union 
dissolution is stress (Aneshensel 1992, Pearlin et al. 1981). Becoming unemployed is a stressful 
life event that may depress income, social status, self-esteem and health (Paul et al. 2018). 
Moreover, unemployment is likely to affect both partners by creating common stressors, such as 
economic hardship, and by the transmission of one partner’s stress to the other, thereby hampering 
relationship quality and increasing the risk of separation (Howe et al. 2005). Unemployment may 
further have a signaling effect: It may signal lower value in the labor market, lower earnings 
potential and hence reduce an individual’s attractiveness as a partner (Boheim & Ermisch 2001, 
Charles & Stephens 2004, Doiron & Mendolia 2012, Vignoli et al. 2016). 
There may be a third and altogether different explanation for the association between 
unemployment and union dissolution, which is that individuals who lose their jobs are more likely 
to separate because they constitute a selective group. Characteristics such as young age, low 
education or working in a menial occupation may increase the likelihood of experiencing both 
unemployment and union dissolution.  
The bulk of studies that analyze the relationship between unemployment and union dissolution 
on the individual level find that workers who lose their job are also more likely to separate from 
their partner. This is the case for Denmark (Jensen & Smith 1990), Finland (Jalovaara 2003, 2013), 
Germany (Franzese & Rapp 2013, Kraft 2001), Norway (Hansen 2005), Sweden (Eliason 2012), 
the UK (Boheim & Ermisch 2001, Doiron & Mendolia 2012) and the United States (Charles & 
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Stephens 2004, Yeung & Hofferth 1998). However, with the notable exception of Eliason (2012) 
who looks at job displacement after firm closure rather than unemployment, none of these studies 
explicitly addresses selection by using a counterfactual design and including a comparable control 
group of workers who did not lose their job. However, the inclusion of a control group is crucial to 
address the issue of selection because the counterfactual situation, in the absence of unemployment, 
is not union stability for all couples, but dissolution for some. This means that many individuals 
who became unemployed and then separated would also have seen their couple break up if they 
had not experienced unemployment.  
Nonetheless, given the strong associational evidence that unemployment hampers couple 
stability, we expect to find that an unemployment episode increases the risk of union dissolution. 
Thereby, we try to improve on earlier research by assessing if this association is present after 
accounting for selection effects and whether it holds across different countries. Hence, our first 
hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: An unemployment spell increases the risk of union dissolution among 
heterosexual co-residing couples.  
Differences by gender 
The risk of union dissolution may depend on whether it is men or women who become 
unemployed. Among others, unemployment has been found to affect men’s health more than 
women’s (Artazcoz et al. 2004). A stronger effect of unemployment on men could be the result of 
the gendered division of labor. If men take home a larger share of the household income, their 
unemployment may be more consequential for the household’s economic security. As a result, 
unemployment of men might produce more financial stress and therefore have a stronger effect on 
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the risk of union dissolution. Moreover, regardless of the actual division of labor within the couple, 
men may still have a stronger identification with work and derive their own status to a larger extent 
from their job. Becoming unemployed may thus be more detrimental to men’s self-esteem. This 
effect is further strengthened if being out of work is seen as reflecting more negatively on men than 
women (Michniewicz et al. 2014), because the social norm to be in paid employment is still 
stronger for men than women (Lalive & Stutzer 2010). 
Empirical support for unemployment leading to an increase in divorce if witnessed by men, but 
not by women, has been found for Denmark in the period of 1979-1985 (Jensen & Smith 1990). 
More recent data for Finland (Jalovaara 2003) and Norway (Hansen 2005) suggest that 
unemployment among either husbands or wives is positively associated with divorce. Nonetheless, 
the effect on divorce seems stronger for men’s than women’s unemployment, be it in Germany 
(Franzese & Rapp 2013), Finland (Jalovaara 2003) or Sweden (Eliason 2012). Our second 
hypothesis therefore expects his unemployment to be more detrimental for couple stability than her 
unemployment: 
Hypothesis 2: An unemployment spell increases the risk of union dissolution more if the male 
rather than the female partner becomes unemployed. 
Differences by household income 
Stress has been defined as a condition in which the demands of the environment exceed 
individuals’ resources to cope (Amato & Beattie 2011: 706). A negative life event such as an 
unemployment spell may produce more or less stress depending on an individual’s resources. This 
suggests that unemployment may have a heterogeneous effect on couple stability – that is, an effect 
that possibly varies by household income. 
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If one of the main benefits from being in a couple stems from shared consumption and insurance 
against negative shocks to household earnings, individuals in low-income households should be 
less likely to separate after becoming unemployed. Experiencing a period of unemployment 
increases the economic benefits of marriage to a larger degree for low-income than mid- or high-
income households. On the contrary, if couple stability increases with the economic resources that 
individuals possess, low-income households may be at a greater risk of union dissolution after 
becoming unemployed (Hansen 2005).  
Conflicting predictions have been made as to whether consequences of unemployment are 
harsher for individuals with a higher or a lower socio-economic status (Paul et al. 2018). On the 
one hand, individuals formerly employed in higher status jobs may suffer more, because they tend 
to lose a more attractive workplace, their occupation may be more central to their identity, and they 
may feel more stigmatized as the event is rare and harder to justify than losing a blue-collar job. 
On the other hand, individuals formerly employed in higher status jobs may not only have more 
economic means, but possibly also better coping strategies (Kulik 2000). To the extent that they 
also have higher levels of education, they may fall back to educational attainment as an alternative 
provider of identity.  
Empirical findings from meta-analyses on the consequences of unemployment suggest that job 
loss has more negative effects on couples with lower income. Notably in terms of mental health 
and wellbeing, this effect seems clear (McKee-Ryan et al. 2005, Paul & Moser 2009). More 
generally, studies assessing how unemployment affects partnerships single out economic hardship 
as a crucial determinant that increases depression and anxiety in both partners (Price et al. 2002, 
Weckström 2012), thereby affecting marital adjustment (Kinnunen & Feldt 2004). Overall, we thus 
expect couples with higher income to be less likely to separate following unemployment than 
couples in lower-income households. This leads to our third hypothesis:  
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Hypothesis 3: The experience of unemployment increases the risk of union dissolution more for 
couples with low household income than high household income. 
Country context 
Our analysis compares three countries with different welfare states and institutional rules for 
individuals faced with unemployment. Given the small number of countries, there is no point in 
formulating country-level hypotheses. However, it is useful to review the two key dimensions that 
affect the stress created by a spell of unemployment: the generosity of unemployment benefits and 
the difficulty to find a new job.  
With respect to benefit generosity, there is clear evidence that unemployed workers who receive 
financial support fare better in terms of mental health and life satisfaction than their colleagues 
who receive no or only meager benefits (Wulfgramm 2014). In line with this finding, a meta-
analysis suggests that the effect of unemployment is less severe in countries with stronger social 
safety nets (Paul and Moser 2009). Our study includes the German and Swiss welfare states molded 
by Bismarck and the British welfare state carrying the imprint of Beveridge (Bonoli 1997). In the 
Bismarckian logic of corporatism, unemployment benefits are proportional to pre-displacement 
earnings and thus preserve status differences among the unemployed. In contrast, Britain’s welfare 
state has an anti-poverty focus and is based on minimum income schemes that mostly pay out flat-
rate benefits (Clasen & Clegg 2011). As a consequence, unemployment benefits are much higher 
in Germany and Switzerland than the UK, with replacement rates of previous income of 60% in 
Germany and 72% in Switzerland as compared to 34% in the UK (OECD 2020). Moreover, the 
duration of entitlement with unemployment insurance is twice as long in Germany (12 months) and 
thrice as long in Switzerland (18 months) as in the UK where it is limited to 6 months (OECD 
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2020). Unemployed individuals in the UK thus depend to a greater extent on means-tested benefits 
such as the jobseeker allowance (Clasen & Clegg 2011).  
Weaker income protection in the UK may be partly compensated by a more dynamic labor 
market that offers unemployed workers better prospects of quickly returning to a job. The British 
labor market has, comparable to the United States, higher turnover rates and a stronger culture of 
hire-and-fire that results in less long-term unemployment (DiPrete et al. 1997). Indeed, while the 
unemployment rates did not differ much over the last two decades in our three countries (with the 
lowest average in Switzerland, the highest in Germany and the UK in-between), the incidence of 
long-term unemployment was substantially lower in the UK than in Switzerland and Germany. 
Almost half of the unemployed in Germany spend more than a year on unemployment, but this is 
the case only for a third in Switzerland and a fourth in the UK.5 
Institutions may not only leave their imprint on our treatment variable of unemployment, but 
also on our outcome variable of couple stability. In terms of partnership prevalence or divorce rates, 
our three countries vary little. In 2011, the share of adults who were cohabiting, married or in 
registered partnerships amounted to 64% in Switzerland, 63% in Germany and 61% in the UK 
(OECD 2016: 2). While marriage is somewhat more widespread in Germany and Switzerland, 
more couples are cohabiting in the UK. Yet differences are again small, with 53% of the adult 
population being married in Germany and Switzerland as compared to 48% in the UK (OECD 
2016: 2). With respect to divorce, the UK used to have a much higher rate in the 1980s and 1990s. 
                                                 
5 Between 2000 and 2019, the unemployment rate was 6.9% in Germany, 5.7% in the UK and 4.1% in Switzerland. 
Between 2000 and 2018, the share of all the unemployed individuals who were unemployed for over a year was 
48% in Germany, 35% in Switzerland and 27% in the UK (OECD statistics, https://stats.oecd.org/ assessed on 6 
June 2020).  
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However, since the early 2000s, the British divorce rate has declined continuously and by the 
2010s, the UK had a slightly lower divorce rate than Switzerland and Germany (OECD 2019: 4). 
This comparison suggests that the mechanisms at play in union creation and dissolution may be 
similar in the three countries. Still, income protection is much lower and paid out for a shorter 
period in the UK than Germany and Switzerland. This leads us to expect that an unemployment 
spell creates more stress and economic hardship in the UK, notably for low-income households.  
Data and measures  
Our analyses are based on household panels that provide yearly data on individuals and 
households: the German Socio-Economic Panel 1984-2017 (SOEP), the Swiss Household Panel 
(SHP) 1999-2018 as well as the British Household Panel Study 1991-2008 (BHPS) and UK 
Household Longitudinal Study 2009-2018 (UKHLS), also known as Understanding Society. All 
three household panels interview all household members (of a certain age) and thus gathers 
information from both partners directly.  
We construct a couple-year dataset. Our analytical sample includes all heterosexual couples at 
risk of experiencing unemployment (our treatment variable) in the age range from 25 to 64. We 
restrict the analysis to couples where the two partners are observed as living in the same household 
for at least three years and where at least one member is in the labor force. After additionally 
dropping unmatched couples (see below), we obtain 22,624 couples for Germany, 6,220 for 
Switzerland and 31,326 for the UK.  
Our dependent variable is the separation of heterosexual couples, including both cohabiting and 
married couples, during the year of unemployment or the three following years. Respondents report 
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annually on the presence of a partner in the household. We consider a couple to be separated when 
one partner leaves the household, excluding cases of widowhood.  
Our key independent variable is an unemployment spell, defined as moving from employment 
to unemployment by either partner in the couple.6 We include all unemployment spells in our 
analysis. As a robustness test, we show how results change when unemployment is defined as 
lasting at least 4 months or when it only includes spells caused by redundancy or dismissal (in the 
UK) and firm closure or employers’ decision (in Germany). When an unemployment spell spans 
over multiple survey waves (e.g., t and t+1), it is assigned to the first year of occurrence (year t).  
For the analysis of heterogeneous effects by income, we stratify our analytical sample into three 
hierarchically ordered income terciles. These terciles are based on post-government household 
income measured two years before the unemployment spell. Household incomes are deflated with 
the consumer price index and adjusted for household size using the OECD equivalence scale (a 
weight of 1 for the respondent, 0.5 for other adults and 0.3 for children). 
Table A.1 in the appendix provides descriptive statistics and shows that 16% of couples 
separated in the German and the UK sample compared with 14% in the Swiss sample. The 
incidence of unemployment is highest in the UK data where we observe a spell of unemployment 
for 27% of couples as compared to 24% in the German data and 13% in the Swiss data. For 
Switzerland, we have not only a much smaller sample, but also a smaller share of couples 
experiencing unemployment. For this reason, we only show the main effect of unemployment on 
union dissolution for Switzerland and abstain from subsample analyses.  
 
                                                 
6 In the SHP and SOEP, individuals report each year their employment status on a monthly basis as well as their current 
labor force status. In UKHLS, personal questionnaires reconstruct the work activity of respondents at the time of 
the interview as well as any labor market spell that began after the interview of the previous year. 
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Matching method 
Our analytical strategy approaches a causal design by addressing reverse causality and selection 
bias. Under the potential outcome framework (Rubin 1974), each couple has two potential 
outcomes:  𝑌(1) indicates the likelihood of separation that would result if the couple experienced 
an episode of unemployment, and 𝑌(0) indicates the likelihood of separation if the couple did not 
experience any unemployment. Therefore, for each couple, the causal effect of unemployment on 
the likelihood of separation is defined as 𝑌(1) − 𝑌(0). Because each couple is observed only in 
either the treatment or the control group, either 𝑌(1) or 𝑌(0) is observed for each couple. This 
means that the counterfactual separation rate must be estimated using a control group. 
We make the control and treatment group as comparable as possible by using a matching 
approach. For each couple that is affected by a partner’s unemployment (treatment group), we try 
to identify couples in which partners were not unemployed, but who were observed during the same 
time period and who shared similar socio-demographic characteristics and thus had a similar risk 
of unemployment and couple dissolution (control group). 
We use the matching method of coarsened exact matching (CEM, Iacus et al. 2011), which 
involves three steps. First, we temporarily coarsen each control variable that may confound the 
influence of unemployment on separation by transforming it into categories (age, for example, is 
coarsened into four categories). Second, we sort all units into strata, each of which has the same 
values of the coarsened variables. Third, we drop the couples in any stratum that do not include at 
least one treated and one control unit. 
The variables used for matching include, for each partner, age (25-34; 35-44; 45-54; 55-64), 
education (ISCED 1-2; 3-4; 5-6) and occupation (ISCO major group 1-2, 3, 4, 5, 6-7-8, 9, missing). 
On the couple level we further include the survey year, children in the household (yes/no), being 
married (yes/no), partners’ labor force participation two years before unemployment (both work 
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vs. one is not active in labor force).7 We further use indicators for assortative mating which possibly 
increase couple’s stability (Boertien & Härkönen 2018, Matysiak et al. 2014): the difference in 
partners’ age (woman more than 2 years older; age difference between -2 and 2 years; man more 
than 2 years older) and education (male partner more hihly educated, same education, female 
partner more highly educated).  
Tables W.1 to W.3 in the web-appendix show the descriptive statistics of the treatment and 
control group, before and after matching. For some individuals in the treatment group, the matching 
algorithm did not find a comparable individual in the control group (in technical terms, there was 
no common support, Iacus et al. 2011). These individuals were left out from the analysis. 
The year used for matching precedes the unemployment spell of the treatment group by two 
years to prevent reverse causality. For each unemployment spell, we then create a six-year 
observation period (two years before unemployment, the year of unemployment, and up to three 
years after). For each treated couple that we observe before an unemployment spell, the matching 
algorithm finds one or more similar counterfactuals in the control group. This allows us to compare 
the likelihood of separation for these two groups.  
Regression model  
We estimate the impact of a partner’s unemployment on a couple’s risk of dissolution using a 
fixed-effects panel model (Halaby 2004). Combined with matching, this provides us with a 
difference-in-differences design (Balbo & Arpino, 2016). After matching the treated to their 
counterfactuals, we then estimate the rate of separation in the two groups in a time window 
spanning from 𝑡 = −1 (the year after matching) to 𝑡 = 3. This model only uses the within-couple 
variance over time and thus eliminates time-constant unobserved heterogeneity such as personality 
                                                 
7 In the UK, we further match for partnership duration (less than 2 years, 2-5 years, 5-10 years, 10-20 years, 20+ years).  
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and abilities, which might affect both the risk of unemployment and partnership separation. We 
estimate the following model:  
𝑌𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑈𝑘
3
𝑘=−2 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝐼𝑔 𝑈𝑘
3
𝑘=−2 + 𝜐𝑗𝑡 (1) 
 
Where 𝑌𝑗𝑡 is a dichotomous indicator for the status of a couple j (0 = intact; 1= separated) at 
time t. 𝑈𝑘 indicates the time dummies for the k
th year relative to the year of unemployment, and 𝛽𝑘 
represents the separation rate of a couple that is not affected by unemployment. Our model thus 
allows us to determine the separation rate of the control group. 𝐼𝑔  identifies the couples 
experiencing an unemployment spell and is interacted with the time indicators. The subscript g 
indicates the gender of the partner experiencing an unemployment spell (0 = female; 1= male).  The 
coefficient 𝛾𝑘 captures the differential rate of separation among couples experiencing an 
unemployment spell relative to the control group in a given year. If the separation rate is higher 
(lower), it needs to be added (subtracted) to the control group’s baseline separation rate. 𝛼𝑗 is the 
couple’s fixed effect, while 𝜐𝑗𝑡 captures idiosyncratic errors. We use standard errors clustered for 
individuals because the observations are not independent over time.   
Note that our difference-in-differences design seeks to overcome a typical issue affecting event 
history models that are also commonly used for our type of research question: the presence of 
couple-specific, time-invariant and unobserved effects denoted as 𝛼𝑗 in the equation above. Fixed-
effects panel regressions control for time-constant differences between couples in unobserved 
traits. Of course, there may be unobserved time-varying couple characteristics that correlate with 
the occurrence of unemployment. This issue means that, although we try to get closer to a causal 
model, we cannot claim to identify strict causal mechanisms.  
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The effect of unemployment on couple stability 
We test our first hypothesis by examining whether a spell of unemployment increases the risk 
of a subsequent union dissolution. The estimates for the three countries are presented in Figure 1. 
The left-hand panel of each country chart displays the predicted annual risk of separation for the 
control group. The right-hand panel shows the additional risk of separation for couples that 
experienced an unemployment spell. The full regression is shown in Table W.4 in the web-
appendix.  
The left-hand panels reveal that couples in the United Kingdom and Switzerland who do not 
experience unemployment have a predicted separation rate that oscillates around 2% per year over 
our five-year observation window. In Germany, the predicted probability of separation is slightly 
higher and fluctuates between 2 and 2.5% per year. Consistent with the descriptive statistics 
discussed above, the three countries in our study show very similar separation rates, with about one 
co-residing couple in fifty separating every year. 
Our main interest lies in the right-hand panels that show the differential risk of separation for 
couples where either the male or female partner experiences a spell of unemployment (our 
treatment group). In all three countries, this group’s separation rate in the year before an 
unemployment spell is not any different from the separation rate of the control group (the additional 
separation rate is around 0). This suggests that our matching method works as the couples in the 
control and treatment group initially show the same propensity to separate. However, a spell of 
unemployment leads to a substantial increase in the likelihood of union dissolution in all three 
countries. The right-hand panels show that for the UK and Germany, the excess risk ranges between 
1.5 and 2.5 percentage points in the years following an unemployment spell. In Switzerland the 
additional risk of separation lies a bit lower at 1.5 percentage points. This means that an 
unemployment spell almost doubles a couple’s risk of separation, increasing from 2% (control 
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group) to between 3.5%-4.5% (treatment group). Rather than pulling couples together, 
unemployment increases the risk of separation.   
Figure 1 shows that the effect of unemployment on couple’s stability is not limited to the year 
when the unemployment spell begins, but remains strong and statistically significant in the 
subsequent three years. This not only supports our first hypothesis of an increased likelihood of 
separation, but also shows that this effect persists. There are several possible explanations for this 
long-lasting effect. Unemployment likely triggers a period of uncertainty, job-seeking and re-
adjustment to new circumstances. This process may increase stress and dissatisfaction in the 
partnership, leading to conflict and possibly separations – but separations and notably divorce are 
a time-consuming business that may be in the making for a moment before it results in the end of 
co-residence. Moreover, the experience of unemployment often leaves long-terms scars on mental 
well-being (Mousteri 2018) and work careers, forcing workers to downgrade to less paid and less 
advantageous jobs (Gangl 2006). These longer term effects may lead to separation later down the 
line.  
This leads us to our second hypothesis which expects a more negative impact of men’s than 
women’s unemployment on couple’s stability. Figure 1 distinguishes whether a couple was hit by 
unemployment of the male or female partner in the United Kingdom and Germany. There is no 
difference for the UK. For Germany, the point estimates suggest that the extra risk of union 
dissolution increases slightly more if men become unemployed rather than women in three years 
following an unemployment spell. However, the differences are very small and not statistically 
significant. This suggests that there is no consistent effect and thus leads us to reject the second 
hypothesis. The separation rate increases to a similar extent if an unemployment spell is 
experienced by the male or the female partner. 
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Figure 1: Predicted probability of separation for couples in control group (in %, left panel), predicted additional probability of separation 
for couples in treatment group (in percentage points, right panel)
 
Data: BHPS 1999-2008, UKHLS 2009-2018, SOEP 1984-2017, SHP 1999-2018 
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Varying effects by household income 
We test our third hypothesis by assessing whether the effect of unemployment on separation 
rates varies by household income. Results are shown in Figure 2 and present again the separation 
rates for the control group in the left-hand panel and the additional risk of separation for the 
treatment group in the right-hand panel. For these stratified analyses, we no longer distinguish 
whether it is men or women who become unemployed. The full regression is shown in Table W.5 
in the web-appendix.  
We first focus on the separation rates for the control group and observe for Germany and the 
UK the income gradient of separation reported in the literature (De Graaf & Kalmijn 2006, 
Härkönen & Dronkers 2006): Couples in the lowest income tercile have systematically higher 
separation rates than couples in the middle and highest income tercile. The contrast is sizable as 
the separation rates of low-income couples exceed those of high-income couples by almost one 
percentage point in both Germany and the UK.  
Consistent with our expectations, low-income couples in the UK seem to face a higher risk of 
separation after an unemployment spell than high-income couples. While confidence intervals are 
large, point estimates suggest that when a partner becomes unemployed, couples in mid- and high-
income terciles see their separation rates go up by about one to two percentage points in the UK as 
compared to three percentage points among couples in the low-income tercile. In contrast, we do 
not observe any income effect for Germany where the three income groups face the same additional 
risk of union dissolution. These results only partly confirm our third hypothesis which expected 
low-income couples to be more vulnerable after an unemployment spell because they are likely to 
have fewer financial resources to cope with stress. Our analysis suggests that this may be the case 
in the UK where the welfare state provides a much weaker social safety net for the unemployed 
than in Germany. 
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Figure 2: Predicted probability of separation for couples in control group (in %, left panel), predicted additional probability of separation 
for couples in treatment group (in percentage points, right panel) by household income terciles 
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Robustness tests 
We perform a series of robustness tests. We begin by estimating a simple fixed-effects model without 
matching for a control group (see Figure A.1 in the appendix). The results lead to the same conclusions. 
The year before an unemployment spell, annual separation rates are about 1.5% in Switzerland and the 
UK, around 2.5% in Germany. Separation rates double with the onset of unemployment and fluctuate at 
around 3% in the UK and 4% in Germany and Switzerland during our observation window. Whether it 
is men or women who become unemployed does not seem to make a significant difference. This model 
without a control group is, however, not able to distinguish between the effect of unemployment and the 
possibility that separation rates may increase over time in general, as couples without unemployment 
spells do not enter the equation.  
Another source of doubt may be the shortness of many unemployment spells. We thus re-estimate our 
initial model (with matching and fixed effects), but only include unemployment spells that last four 
months or longer, thereby eliminating short and possibly inconsequential unemployment episodes. While 
these results show exactly the same pattern over time, the effect size becomes a bit larger (see Figures 
A.2 and A.3 in the appendix). The additional separation rate due to unemployment reaches almost three 
percentage points in Germany and the UK. Again, there are no gender differences nor a heterogeneous 
effect by household income in Germany, but only in the United Kingdom.  
Another concern is that some couples let one partner’s contract end on purpose in order to improve 
their work-life balance. We test this assumption of “voluntary” unemployment by only including those 
unemployment spells that are caused by “redundancy” or “dismissal” in the United Kingdom (as in 
Upward & Wright, 2017) and “firm closure” or “employers’ decision” in Germany (as in DeNew & 
Haisken-DeNew, 2009). When only considering these unemployment spells that are less prone to 
individuals’ agency, we find that unemployment becomes more disruptive for couples (see Figure A.4 in 
the appendix). In both Germany and the UK, separation rates are half a percentage point higher if 
unemployment is due to firm closure, redundancy or employers’ decisions. Moreover, men’s 
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unemployment appears to affect couples more negatively than women’s unemployment. However, since 
confidence intervals are larger than in our standard model and overlap, we prefer not to draw strong 
conclusions. 
We further test the possibility of a differential impact by gender. Our theoretical expectation of a more 
disruptive effect of male than female unemployment was based on the assumption that men contribute, 
on average, more income to the household than women. We test this assumption directly by 
distinguishing whether an unemployment spell is experienced by a partner who is – or who is not – the 
couple’s main earner, the main earner being defined as earning more than 55% of the couple’s work 
income. These results indeed suggest that a spell of unemployment may be more disruptive if it is 
experienced by the couple’s main earner (see Figure A.5 in the appendix). In both Germany and the UK, 
separation rates are half a percentage point higher if the main earner becomes unemployed – an effect 
that is not negligible given the baseline separation rate of about 2%. At the same time, the large size of 
confidence intervals dissuades us from drawing strong conclusions. 
Finally, a stronger impact of his than her unemployment was also expected on the basis of the idea 
that unemployment may be more detrimental to men’s social status and identity than women’s, notably 
in contexts where gender roles are traditional (Poortman 2005). We test this idea by dividing the German 
data into two periods: 1984-1999 and 2000-2017. If gender norms have become less conservative as 
suggested by Germany’s steadily rising female employment rate, then men’s unemployment should be 
more detrimental than women’s unemployment in the earlier, but not later subperiod. Our analysis does 
not confirm this expectation (see Figure A.6 in the appendix). In Germany, men’s unemployment is not 
associated with systematically higher separation rates than women’s unemployment in 1984-1999 or 
2000-2017. 
Conclusion 
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Our paper raised the question of whether the experience of unemployment increases or decreases the 
risk of separation. If one of the main benefits from living in a partnership stems from shared consumption 
and insurance against negative life events, unemployment should reduce the risk of separation. In 
contrast, as unemployment creates economic uncertainty and mental stress, it may decrease relationship 
quality and increase the risk of break-ups. Finally, the relationship may be spurious and driven by 
selection of individuals into both unstable work situations and unstable  partnerships. Our study has tried 
to provide a robust answer to this question for Germany, Switzerland and the UK by using long-running 
panel datasets that allow us to combine a matching-method with fixed-effects regressions. Four main 
findings are noteworthy. 
First, our estimates clearly show that unemployment increases the risk of separation in all three 
countries. The separation rate increases by 1.5 to 2.5 percentage points in the years following an 
unemployment spell. This implies that the experience of unemployment doubles the risk of the couple 
breaking up. Our results are in line with earlier studies for Sweden (Eliason 2012) and the UK (Doiron 
and Mendolia 2012) which report a negative effect of job displacement on the risk of divorce. However, 
they run contrary to the findings provided by Charles and Stephens (2004) who did not find for the United 
States any significant effect on divorce after plant closure (a specific type of job loss).  
Second, our panel regressions show that partnerships are equally affected by men and women’s 
unemployment. In Germany and the UK, the risk of separation is no larger for couples where men become 
unemployed than for couples where women become unemployed. Our results thus contradict findings 
from earlier periods (1979-1985) for Denmark where men’s labor market status was shown to be more 
consequential for couple stability (Jensen & Smith 1990). Yet our findings are consistent with more 
recent studies from Norway (Hansen 2005) and Sweden (Eliason 2012), which show a comparable effect 
of men and women’s unemployment on union dissolution. Our analyses provide tentative evidence that 
an unemployment spell is more disruptive for couples if it affects the main earner.  
Third, our analysis only partly confirms the existence of heterogeneous effects by household income. 
We expected that unemployment would increase the risk of dissolution more for couples with low than 
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high household income, based on the argument that having more financial resources reduces the 
economic uncertainty and mental stress associated with unemployment. Our results do not validate this 
expectation for Germany. Yet they do so for the UK where couples in lower-income households seem 
less shielded from the negative consequences of unemployment. Their separation rates after 
unemployment exceed those of higher-income couples by 1.5 percentage points. One possible 
explanation is that by offering modest income replacement over a short period only, the British welfare 
state turns unemployment into a more stressful life event in the UK than in Germany. However, given 
the limited number of observations in our surveys, our analysis only provides tentative evidence on these 
heterogeneous effects. Future research on register data could go further in-depth and provide a more fine-
grained analysis of how income differences affect couple stability. 
Fourth, despite the differential impact of household income, overall our study provides surprisingly 
similar findings across countries. Consistent with the similarity in partnership prevalence and divorce 
rates, Germany, Switzerland and the UK show similar separation rates for couples having lived together 
for at least two years: 2 to 3% of our control group separate every year. In our three countries, couples 
affected by unemployment show a similar increase in their separation rate, with an additional 1.5 to 2.5 
percentage points. Hence, rather than pointing to cross-country differences, our comparison points to a 
micro-level mechanism that looks much alike in the three West European countries under study. This 
suggest that it is not solely a matter of reduced resources that turns unemployment into a stressful and 
potentially disruptive event.     
Finally, our study confirms that decreasing separation rates during periods of high unemployment that 
are consistently found in country-level studies are not driven by couples who themselves experience 
unemployment. Although divorce rates tend to decline in recessions (Amato & Beattie 2011, Kalmijn 
2007), individuals who become unemployed are still more likely to see their couples break up. Hence, 
unemployment does not strengthen couples, but makes them more vulnerable – regardless which partner 
becomes unemployed and regardless of a household’s economic resources.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics. Sample size by unemployment occurrence and partnership outcome 
                       
 
United Kingdom 
 
Germany 
 
Switzerland 
 
N 
 
Share 
 
N 
 
Share 
 
N 
 
Share 
Number of couples 31326 
   
22642 
   
6220 
  
Any partner ever unemployed 8360 
 
0,27 
 
5425 
 
0,24 
 
817 
 
0,13 
Couple ever separated 5028 
 
0,16 
 
3697 
 
0,16 
 
853 
 
0,14 
No partner ever unemployed & Couple never separated 19776 
 
0,63 
 
14806 
 
0,65 
 
4726 
 
0,76 
Any partner’s unemployment & Couple never 
separated 
6522 
 
0,21 
 
4139 
 
0,18 
 
641 
 
0,10 
Man’s unemployment & Couple never separated 3221 
 
0,10 
 
2279 
 
0,10 
 
251 
 
0,04 
Woman’s unemployment & Couple never separated 3301 
 
0,11 
 
1860 
 
0,08 
 
390 
 
0,06 
No partner ever unemployed & Couple separated 3190 
 
0,10 
 
2411 
 
0,11 
 
677 
 
0,11 
Any partner’s unemployment & Couple separated  1838 
 
0,06 
 
1286 
 
0,06 
 
176 
 
0,03 
Man’s unemployment & Couple separated  868 
 
0,03 
 
669 
 
0,03 
 
74 
 
0,01 
Woman’s unemployment & Couple separated  970   0,03   617   0,03   102   0,02 
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Figure A.1: Fixed-effects panel regressions without matching on the probability of couples separating (separation rates before and after unemployment)
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Figure A.2: Predicted probability of separation for couples in control group (in %, left panel), predicted additional probability of separation for couples in 
treatment group (in percentage points, right panel) – unemployment spells of at least 4 months
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Figure A.3: Predicted probability of separation for couples in control group (in %, left panel), predicted additional probability of separation for couples in 
treatment group (in percentage points, right panel) – unemployment spells of at least 4 months
 
 
33 
 
Figure A.4: Predicted probability of separation for couples in control group (in %, left panel), predicted additional probability of separation for couples in 
treatment group (in percentage points, right panel) – unemployment defined as redundancy or dismissal (UK), firm closure or employer’s decision (Germany).  
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Figure A.5: Predicted probability of separation for couples in control group (in %, left panel), predicted additional probability of separation for couples in 
treatment group (in percentage points, right panel) – unemployment spells distinguished for main earners (>55% of couple’s labor earnings) and non-main earners 
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Figure A.6 - Germany: Predicted probability of separation for couples in control group (in %, left panel), predicted additional probability of separation for couples 
in treatment group (in percentage points, right panel) - unemployment spells in early period (1984-1999) or recent period (2000-2017) 
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Table W.1 – United Kingdom: Descriptive statistics. Variables in pre and post matching samples 
 
 Couples with an unemployed man & counterfactuals  Couples with an unemployed woman & counterfactuals 
 
 Before Matching  After Matching  Before Matching  After Matching 
  Counterfactual Treated  Counterfactual Treated  Counterfactuals Treated  Counterfactuals Treated 
 
 Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD 
Union duration 0-3 years 0,10 0,30 0,06 0,23 
 
0,17 0,38 0,17 0,38 
 
0,10 0,30 0,06 0,24 
 
0,15 0,36 0,14 0,35 
 
3-6 years 0,12 0,32 0,09 0,29 
 
0,10 0,30 0,14 0,35 
 
0,12 0,32 0,10 0,30 
 
0,09 0,28 0,14 0,35 
 
6-10 years 0,14 0,34 0,13 0,33 
 
0,11 0,31 0,14 0,35 
 
0,13 0,34 0,14 0,35 
 
0,11 0,31 0,13 0,34 
 
10-20 years 0,27 0,45 0,35 0,48 
 
0,27 0,44 0,25 0,43 
 
0,28 0,45 0,32 0,47 
 
0,26 0,44 0,26 0,44 
 
20 years over 0,36 0,48 0,36 0,48 
 
0,36 0,48 0,29 0,46 
 
0,35 0,48 0,37 0,48 
 
0,40 0,49 0,30 0,46 
Dependent children 0,46 0,50 0,46 0,50 
 
0,53 0,50 0,53 0,50 
 
0,46 0,50 0,46 0,50 
 
0,49 0,50 0,51 0,50 
Married couple 0,69 0,46 0,73 0,45 
 
0,85 0,36 0,80 0,40 
 
0,70 0,46 0,72 0,45 
 
0,88 0,32 0,79 0,40 
Man's education Lower Secondary 0,14 0,34 0,10 0,30 
 
0,10 0,30 0,11 0,31 
 
0,13 0,34 0,11 0,32 
 
0,13 0,34 0,14 0,35 
 
Upper Secondary 0,42 0,49 0,46 0,50 
 
0,45 0,50 0,47 0,50 
 
0,42 0,49 0,44 0,50 
 
0,44 0,50 0,45 0,50 
 
Tertiary 0,44 0,50 0,44 0,50 
 
0,45 0,50 0,43 0,50 
 
0,44 0,50 0,45 0,50 
 
0,43 0,50 0,40 0,49 
Woman's education Lower Secondary 0,13 0,33 0,11 0,31 
 
0,12 0,32 0,13 0,34 
 
0,13 0,34 0,09 0,29 
 
0,14 0,35 0,13 0,34 
 
Upper Secondary 0,41 0,49 0,43 0,50 
 
0,45 0,50 0,46 0,50 
 
0,41 0,49 0,43 0,50 
 
0,44 0,50 0,47 0,50 
 
Tertiary 0,47 0,50 0,46 0,50 
 
0,44 0,50 0,41 0,49 
 
0,47 0,50 0,48 0,50 
 
0,42 0,49 0,41 0,49 
Education difference Woman higher 0,22 0,42 0,21 0,41 
 
0,15 0,36 0,17 0,38 
 
0,22 0,41 0,22 0,41 
 
0,15 0,36 0,20 0,40 
 
Same 0,59 0,49 0,60 0,49 
 
0,68 0,47 0,62 0,49 
 
0,59 0,49 0,61 0,49 
 
0,68 0,47 0,61 0,49 
 
Man higher 0,19 0,39 0,20 0,40 
 
0,17 0,38 0,21 0,41 
 
0,19 0,39 0,18 0,38 
 
0,17 0,37 0,18 0,39 
Man's age 24-34 0,15 0,36 0,13 0,33 
 
0,23 0,42 0,25 0,43 
 
0,15 0,36 0,13 0,33 
 
0,18 0,38 0,24 0,43 
 
35-44 0,23 0,42 0,23 0,42 
 
0,29 0,46 0,28 0,45 
 
0,23 0,42 0,24 0,43 
 
0,29 0,45 0,28 0,45 
 
45-54 0,25 0,43 0,28 0,45 
 
0,24 0,43 0,27 0,44 
 
0,25 0,43 0,27 0,44 
 
0,22 0,42 0,25 0,44 
 
55-64 0,36 0,48 0,37 0,48 
 
0,23 0,42 0,20 0,40 
 
0,36 0,48 0,37 0,48 
 
0,31 0,46 0,23 0,42 
Woman's age 24-34 0,20 0,40 0,18 0,38 
 
0,32 0,47 0,31 0,46 
 
0,20 0,40 0,18 0,38 
 
0,27 0,44 0,31 0,46 
 
35-44 0,25 0,43 0,26 0,44 
 
0,28 0,45 0,28 0,45 
 
0,25 0,43 0,26 0,44 
 
0,27 0,44 0,28 0,45 
 
45-54 0,24 0,43 0,25 0,43 
 
0,22 0,41 0,24 0,43 
 
0,24 0,43 0,26 0,44 
 
0,23 0,42 0,25 0,44 
 
55-64 0,30 0,46 0,32 0,47 
 
0,18 0,39 0,16 0,37 
 
0,31 0,46 0,31 0,46 
 
0,24 0,43 0,16 0,37 
Age difference Woman 2+ years 0,11 0,31 0,12 0,33 
 
0,06 0,23 0,10 0,30 
 
0,11 0,32 0,11 0,31 
 
0,04 0,19 0,09 0,29 
 
-2/2 years 0,43 0,50 0,44 0,50 
 
0,52 0,50 0,49 0,50 
 
0,43 0,50 0,45 0,50 
 
0,49 0,50 0,46 0,50 
 
Man 2+ years 0,46 0,50 0,44 0,50 
 
0,43 0,49 0,41 0,49 
 
0,46 0,50 0,44 0,50 
 
0,47 0,50 0,46 0,50 
Labour force Man active 0,61 0,49 0,67 0,47 
 
0,81 0,40 0,89 0,32 
 
0,61 0,49 0,62 0,49 
 
0,74 0,44 0,80 0,40 
  Woman active 0,59 0,49 0,59 0,49   0,71 0,45 0,76 0,43   0,58 0,49 0,63 0,48   0,67 0,47 0,79 0,41 
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Table W.2 – Germany: Descriptive statistics. Variables in pre and post matching samples 
 
  
Couples with an unemployed man & counterfactuals   Couples with an unemployed woman & counterfactuals 
  
Before Matching 
 
After Matching 
 
Before Matching 
 
After Matching 
  
Counterfactuals Treated 
 
Counterfactuals Treated 
 
Counterfactuals Treated 
 
Counterfactuals Treated 
  
Mean SD Mean SD   Mean SD Mean SD   Mean SD Mean SD   Mean SD Mean SD 
Dependent children 0,50 0,50 0,43 0,50 
 
0,62 0,48 0,56 0,50 
 
0,51 0,50 0,41 0,49 
 
0,61 0,49 0,51 0,50 
Married couple 0,83 0,38 0,86 0,34 
 
0,91 0,28 0,90 0,31 
 
0,84 0,37 0,84 0,37 
 
0,93 0,25 0,90 0,30 
Man's education Lower Secondary 0,11 0,32 0,14 0,35 
 
0,09 0,28 0,14 0,35 
 
0,12 0,32 0,11 0,31 
 
0,05 0,22 0,09 0,28 
 
Upper Secondary 0,53 0,50 0,58 0,49 
 
0,63 0,48 0,66 0,47 
 
0,53 0,50 0,58 0,49 
 
0,60 0,49 0,62 0,49 
 
Tertiary 0,36 0,48 0,28 0,45 
 
0,28 0,45 0,20 0,40 
 
0,35 0,48 0,31 0,46 
 
0,35 0,48 0,30 0,46 
Woman's education Lower Secondary 0,17 0,38 0,23 0,42 
 
0,16 0,37 0,24 0,43 
 
0,18 0,39 0,18 0,38 
 
0,11 0,31 0,16 0,36 
 
Upper Secondary 0,56 0,50 0,55 0,50 
 
0,61 0,49 0,58 0,49 
 
0,56 0,50 0,59 0,49 
 
0,63 0,48 0,62 0,49 
 
Tertiary 0,26 0,44 0,22 0,42 
 
0,23 0,42 0,18 0,39 
 
0,26 0,44 0,24 0,43 
 
0,27 0,44 0,22 0,42 
Education difference Woman higher 0,13 0,34 0,14 0,35 
 
0,06 0,24 0,11 0,32 
 
0,13 0,34 0,13 0,33 
 
0,06 0,24 0,11 0,31 
 
Same 0,59 0,49 0,59 0,49 
 
0,75 0,43 0,66 0,47 
 
0,59 0,49 0,61 0,49 
 
0,74 0,44 0,65 0,48 
 
Man higher 0,28 0,45 0,27 0,44 
 
0,19 0,39 0,23 0,42 
 
0,28 0,45 0,26 0,44 
 
0,20 0,40 0,24 0,43 
Man's age 24-34 0,15 0,36 0,12 0,33 
 
0,22 0,41 0,24 0,43 
 
0,15 0,36 0,13 0,33 
 
0,16 0,37 0,21 0,40 
 
35-44 0,27 0,44 0,24 0,43 
 
0,35 0,48 0,27 0,44 
 
0,27 0,44 0,25 0,43 
 
0,37 0,48 0,31 0,46 
 
45-54 0,28 0,45 0,23 0,42 
 
0,24 0,43 0,25 0,44 
 
0,27 0,45 0,25 0,43 
 
0,27 0,44 0,24 0,43 
 
55-64 0,31 0,46 0,41 0,49 
 
0,18 0,39 0,24 0,43 
 
0,31 0,46 0,38 0,49 
 
0,20 0,40 0,24 0,43 
Woman's age 24-34 0,22 0,41 0,18 0,38 
 
0,33 0,47 0,33 0,47 
 
0,22 0,41 0,20 0,40 
 
0,26 0,44 0,30 0,46 
 
35-44 0,30 0,46 0,24 0,43 
 
0,36 0,48 0,27 0,44 
 
0,29 0,46 0,26 0,44 
 
0,38 0,49 0,31 0,46 
 
45-54 0,25 0,43 0,23 0,42 
 
0,19 0,40 0,25 0,43 
 
0,25 0,43 0,24 0,43 
 
0,23 0,42 0,22 0,42 
 
55-64 0,24 0,42 0,35 0,48 
 
0,12 0,33 0,15 0,36 
 
0,24 0,43 0,30 0,46 
 
0,13 0,33 0,17 0,37 
Age difference Woman 2+ years 0,08 0,27 0,10 0,30 
 
0,03 0,17 0,06 0,24 
 
0,08 0,28 0,08 0,27 
 
0,02 0,15 0,05 0,22 
 
-2/2 yrs 0,42 0,49 0,42 0,49 
 
0,45 0,50 0,43 0,50 
 
0,42 0,49 0,40 0,49 
 
0,46 0,50 0,43 0,50 
 
Man 2+ years 0,50 0,50 0,48 0,50 
 
0,52 0,50 0,51 0,50 
 
0,50 0,50 0,52 0,50 
 
0,52 0,50 0,53 0,50 
Labour force Man active 0,81 0,39 0,87 0,34 
 
0,97 0,17 1,00 0,05 
 
0,82 0,38 0,77 0,42 
 
0,97 0,18 0,89 0,31 
  Woman active 0,74 0,44 0,70 0,46   0,76 0,43 0,70 0,46   0,72 0,45 0,85 0,35   0,92 0,27 0,99 0,11 
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Table W.3 – Switzerland: Descriptive statistics. Variables in pre and post matching samples 
  
Couples with any unemployed partner & counterfactuals 
  Before Matching  After Matching 
  Counterfactuals  Treated  Counterfactuals  Treated 
  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Dependent children 0,38 0,49 
 
0,36 0,48 
 
0,55 0,50 
 
0,54 0,50 
Married couple 0,83 0,38 
 
0,84 0,37 
 
0,85 0,36 
 
0,89 0,31 
Man's education Lower Secondary 0,06 0,23 
 
0,09 0,29 
 
0,02 0,13 
 
0,03 0,17 
 
Upper Secondary 0,48 0,50 
 
0,46 0,50 
 
0,48 0,50 
 
0,50 0,50 
 
Tertiary 0,46 0,50 
 
0,45 0,50 
 
0,50 0,50 
 
0,47 0,50 
Woman's education Lower Secondary 0,11 0,31 
 
0,12 0,32 
 
0,05 0,22 
 
0,08 0,27 
 
Upper Secondary 0,62 0,49 
 
0,53 0,50 
 
0,69 0,46 
 
0,69 0,47 
 
Tertiary 0,28 0,45 
 
0,35 0,48 
 
0,26 0,44 
 
0,24 0,43 
Education 
difference 
Woman higher 0,11 0,31 
 
0,15 0,36 
 
0,04 0,20 
 
0,07 0,25 
 
Same 0,56 0,50 
 
0,57 0,50 
 
0,65 0,48 
 
0,61 0,49 
 
Man higher 0,33 0,47 
 
0,28 0,45 
 
0,31 0,46 
 
0,33 0,47 
Man's age 24-34 0,11 0,31 
 
0,08 0,28 
 
0,14 0,35 
 
0,14 0,35 
 
35-44 0,19 0,40 
 
0,20 0,40 
 
0,37 0,48 
 
0,37 0,48 
 
45-54 0,26 0,44 
 
0,30 0,46 
 
0,24 0,43 
 
0,23 0,42 
 
55-64 0,44 0,50 
 
0,42 0,50 
 
0,25 0,43 
 
0,27 0,44 
Woman's age 24-34 0,15 0,36 
 
0,12 0,32 
 
0,22 0,42 
 
0,24 0,43 
 
35-44 0,21 0,41 
 
0,22 0,42 
 
0,39 0,49 
 
0,35 0,48 
 
45-54 0,28 0,45 
 
0,35 0,48 
 
0,21 0,41 
 
0,25 0,44 
 
55-64 0,36 0,48 
 
0,32 0,47 
 
0,18 0,38 
 
0,15 0,36 
Age difference Woman 2+ years 0,09 0,28 
 
0,13 0,33 
 
0,02 0,14 
 
0,04 0,20 
 
-2/2 years 0,42 0,49 
 
0,39 0,49 
 
0,45 0,50 
 
0,42 0,49 
 
Man 2+ years 0,49 0,50 
 
0,48 0,50 
 
0,53 0,50 
 
0,54 0,50 
Labour force Man active 0,88 0,32 
 
0,96 0,19 
 
0,98 0,13 
 
0,98 0,15 
  Woman active 0,82 0,39   0,87 0,34   0,97 0,18   0,95 0,22 
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Table W.4: Fixed-effects regression with matching on couples separating, men or women being unemployed  
 United Kingdom  Germany  Switzerland 
 
Man's 
unemployment 
Woman's 
unemployment 
Man's 
unemployment 
Woman's 
unemployment 
Any partner's 
unemployment 
t = -1 0.007*** 0.005***  0.007*** 0.006**  0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
t = 0 0.009*** 0.010***  0.011*** 0.010***  0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
t = 1 0.010*** 0.010***  0.010*** 0.012***  0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) 
t =2 0.011*** 0.010***  0.009*** 0.010***  0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) 
t = 3 0.007*** 0.008***  0.007*** 0.011***  0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) 
t = -1 * treated -0.013*** -0.008***  -0.014*** -0.012***  -0.009** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) 
t = 0 * treated 0.004 -0.001  0.003 0.002  0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
 (0.004) (0.005)  (0.004) 
t = 1 * treated 0.005 0.007  0.006 -0.001  0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.004) 
t = 2 * treated 0.004 0.005  0.003 0.008  -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.004) 
t = 3 * treated 0.010** 0.011**  0.012** 0.008  0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
 (0.005) (0.006)  (0.005) 
Constant 0.007*** 0.007***  0.010*** 0.009***  0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
    
   
 
Observations 204,913 198,333  158,880 145,812  104,366 
R-squared 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002  0.002 
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Table W.5: Fixed-effects regression with matching on couples separating after an unemployment spell – 
couples separated into three income terciles based on household income 
 United Kingdom  Germany 
 1st tercile 2nd tercile 3rd tercile   1st tercile 2nd tercile 3rd tercile 
t = -1 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.007***  0.009*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
t = 0 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.012***  0.015*** 0.008** 0.010*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
t = 1 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.010***  0.013*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
t =2 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.007***  0.013*** 0.003 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
t = 3 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.008***  0.015** 0.003 0.009*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
t = -1 * treated -0.011* -0.012*** -0.011***  -0.014** -0.010** -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
t = 0 * treated 0.003 -0.002 -0.006*  -0.003 0.003 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
t = 1 * treated 0.010 0.002 -0.001  0.001 0.001 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
t = 2 * treated 0.010 -0.002 0.004  -0.005 0.007 -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
t = 3 * treated 0.013 0.011* 0.002  -0.001 0.003 0.008 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) 
Constant 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.006***  0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
        
Observations 57,174 95,904 128,932  55,483 68,467 85,301 
R-squared 0.003 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.001 0.002 
 
     
   
 
